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TASK FORCE ON BUDGET AND
ACCOUNTING — HOOVER COMMISSION
By CHRISTIAN E. JARCHOW, Executive Vice President,
International Harvester Company

total of the indicated savings would be
more than $8 billion, but this is obviously
an overstatement, since some of the esti
mates overlap. However, there was no doubt
in the minds of the commissioners that the
possible savings should be enough to balance
the budget and in addition bring about a
reduction in federal taxes. None of these
savings contemplated a reduction in present
defense programs, the elimination of useful
public works, or a contraction of education,
health and welfare programs.
In addition to these savings, the Com
mission pointed out that there are possi
bilities for recovering federal capital now
invested in certain agencies which could be
sold to private enterprises, such as the
Federal Housing Administration, Federal
Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal Nation
al Mortgage Association, Rural Electrifica
tion Administration, etc. Such recoveries
might exceed $10 billion.

You will probably recall that there have
been two Hoover Commissions, and I think
it might be well to review briefly the accom
plishments of each of these.
The first Commission began its work in
September 1947 and made its final report
in May 1949. Its authority was limited to
recommendations for the reorganization of
departments and agencies. It made 273
recommendations, and some 196 of these
were wholly or partially adopted by either
executive or congressional action. 11 recom
mendations became obsolete or of dimin
ished importance with the passing of time.
This left 66 which were not acted on and
many of them were referred to the second
Hoover Commission for consideration.
The second Commission was authorized
by Congress in July 1953. It made its final
report at the end of June 1955. Its author
ity was enlarged to include recommenda
tions on questions of policy. This commis
sion appointed 19 Task Forces to carry on
its studies.
At its peak, the Commission and the
various Task Forces engaged a total of 525
full-time and part-time personnel. Many of
these served without compensation. These
Task Forces studied some 60 governmental
departments and agencies, which represent
about 95% of the expenditures in the Execu
tive Department.
As a result of the studies by these Task
Forces, the second Hoover Commission
made 362 recommendations. Of these, 50
were of a character which might be sub
mitted as Presidential Reorganization Plans
to the Congress under the Reorganization
Act of 1949, or which might be implemented
by presidential executive order. A second
group of recommendations totaling 145
were within the authority of the various
departments and agencies to adopt if they
wished. The third group of 167 recom
mendations were of a character that would
require legislation.
The primary purpose of the Commission
was to recommend methods by which sav
ings could be made in federal expenditures.
Thirteen of the Task Forces estimated
savings. Five others said that savings were
possible, but stated no amount. A grand

TASK FORCE ON BUDGET
AND ACCOUNTING
The Task Force with which I am most
familiar is that on Budget and Accounting,
of which I was a member. The chairman
of this Task Force was J. Harold Stewart,
head of a public accounting firm in Boston
and formerly president of the American
Institute of Accountants. The other mem
bers were: Dudley E. Brown, Financial
Vice President, Lockheed Aircraft Corpora
tion; H. E. Humphreys, Jr., President and
Chairman of the Board, U.S. Rubber Com
pany; Christian E. Jarchow, Executive
Vice President, International Harvester
Company; Gwilyn A. Price, President,
Westinghouse Electric Corp.; Kenneth C.
Tiffany, Vice President, Burroughs Adding
Machine Company; and J. David Wright,
President, Thompson Products, Inc.
Our first meeting was with Mr. Hoover
two days before Christmas 1953. Subse
quent meetings were held in Washington,
Chicago and New York.
Our Task Force engaged two full-time
staff directors and a number of consultants.
We presented 31 recommendations (later
consolidated to 25) for improvements in
budgeting or accounting. We estimated
5

There is a tendency in Executive
agencies to state the obligations incurred
at the highest possible figures since this
action strengthens the budget requests
for the following year.
The obligation basis of appropriations
produces an incentive in the agencies to
use all available obligational authority
prior to the date when it otherwise would
lapse for obligating purposes. Such action
tends to support agency budget requests
for the following fiscal year.
As a result of this procedure, there is a
substantial amount of unexpended appro
priations carried forward annually into the
following year:
Amount
(In Billions)
brought forward
into the year
1950 ............................. ..... $11.5
1951 ....... ...... ...... ...... ...... 14.1
1952 ........... ............. .......... 50.3
1953 .................. ................ 68.8
1954 .......................... ........ 78.4
1955 ...... ........... ...... .......... 68.0
1956 (estimated) ..... ....... 53.9
This carryover of unobligated authority
for multiple year programs arises from the
practice of making full budget provision
at the outset for such programs, which
funds remain available until expended.
There has been no effective post review
of such appropriations by either the Bureau
of the Budget or the Congress. The pro
cedure has been to review in minute detail
a new program for the budget year under
consideration with little consideration of
past performance. This inadequacy applies
particularly to military procurement.
As a means of controlling government
expenditures more directly and effectively
we proposed that the present budget, which
is in terms of obligational authority, be
replaced by an annual expenditure budget.
Under an annual expenditure budget an
agency would submit initially a properly
described program showing the total funds
required for its completion, projected in
terms of years. The Congress, if it ap
proved the program, would enact an annual
appropriation for the estimated expendi
tures required for the year under consid
eration. In addition, the Congress would
give the agencies contracting authority for
the amount required during the first year
for forward contracting beyond the budget
year. The Executive Branch and the Con
gress thereafter would review the program
annually from the standpoint of costs and
accomplishments, both completed and pro
jected, and grant additional authority.

that the introduction of these improvements
would result in an annual saving of at least
$4 billion or 8½ per cent of the controllable
budget expenditures.
I shall not attempt to review each of
the 31 recommendations, but will comment
on a few of them.
First, let us talk a bit about the budget
itself. It contains over 1,200 pages of de
tailed information—about the size of the
Chicago telephone directory. In addition,
schedules of personnel positions are in
cluded as a separate appendix to the docu
ment.
The budget is presented in great detail.
There are many items of only $1,000 each.
While some progress has been made in
program budgeting, there still remains
much to be done to indicate broad programs
and objectives.
The preparation of the budget begins,
in some agencies, eighteen months prior to
the beginning of the fiscal year to which
the budget relates. The lengthy cycle re
quired for development and enactment of
the budget is a basic defect in the govern
ment’s budget processes and tends to make
the budget out of date before it goes into
effect.
The Task Force on Budget and Account
ing recommended that the length of time
required for developing budget estimates
should be reduced, both in the agencies and
in the Budget Bureau. We also recommend
ed that agency budgets be presented in
more simplified and concise form and be
better supported by factual information in
order that the staffs of the Congressional
Committees be able to complete their re
views in shorter time.
The federal budget is essentially a “cash”
budget and is prepared on the basis of the
estimated “obligations” to be incurred dur
ing the budget year.
The budget fails to take into account
inventories and other working capital avail
able at the beginning of the year which
may be consumed in the programs of the
budget year. Neither does it reflect working
capital which may become available during
the budget year and which will be carried
over to a subsequent year.
Under present procedures there is no
effective control over expenditures either
by the Congress or in the Executive Branch.
This loss of control is attributable to several
factors which can be summarized as follows:
Appropriations are enacted in terms of
the obligational authority required to
carry out approved programs, some of
which relate to long lead time programs.
6

For example, let us assume that the Navy were major programs aggregating $15.3
is asking for legislative approval to con billion or 24% of the total budget; which
struct a ship. The work is to be accom were relatively uncontrollable. This in
plished over a four-year period at a total cluded $6.6 billion for interest which, of
estimated cost of $150 million, of which course, is based on the size of the debt and
$20 million is to be spent in the first year. the applicable interest rates; $3.5 billion
The Department of the Navy, under the for veteran compensation, pensions, and
plan proposed, would furnish complete in benefit programs; $2.2 billion for agricul
formation regarding the entire project. ture price support; $1.4 billion for grants
They would ask for an appropriation of to states for public assistance; and $0.6
(say) $20 million for the current budget billion for Federal-aid highway grants; and
year, to cover goods and services to be re approximately $1.0 billion for nine other
ceived during the first year, they would re programs of like character.
Generally, this type of basis legislation
quest authority to make contracts for long
lead items, and they would show the esti either commits the Federal Government to
mated costs to be covered by future ap specified expenditures or prescribes for
mulae which automatically determine the
propriations.
Congress would pass an annual appro amounts of the appropriations required.
priation on a “goods and services received” Agricultural legislation, for example, re
basis of $20 million to cover the first year’s quires that prices shall be supported at
estimate. In addition, the Congress would certain levels, which in turn depends upon
grant contracting authority in the amount the state of the markets for agricultural
needed for long lead time items. This would products. Legislation granting funds to the
provide authority for the Navy to proceed states for public welfare assistance pre
with the work and enter into forward con scribes the rates at which assistance shall
be provided to claimants, and appropriations
tracts.
In its annual appropriation request for are governed by the number of claimants.
the second year the Navy Department would Similarly, veterans legislation establishes
submit experience data showing how con rates for readjustment allowances, and
struction is proceeding, together with expenditures under such programs depend
latest cost information. The Department upon the number of qualifying veterans.
Through the enactment of such authoriz
might request an annual appropriation of,
say, $50 million, their estimate of goods ing legislation which involves commitments,
and services to be received in the second the Congress has diluted effective control
year. However, because of a lower priority over an important area of government
given to Naval construction in that budget spending. Therefore, the burden of making
year and a decision to stretch out the proj adjustments in budget expenditures tends
ect, the Congress might reduce the Depart to fall upon the more controllable programs.
We recommend that whenever legislation
ment’s request for the second year’s appro
was passed committing the government to
priation to $35 million.
Under present practice an appropriation continuing expenditures for special pro
for the entire $150 million would be made grams which are not susceptible to the
at the outset. Except as the Congress might usual budgetary control, it be enacted for
rescind a previous authority, it has lost a limited term in order to obtain periodic
control over the rate of construction and Congressional review of its usefulness. Also,
that the Bureau of the Budget keep such
expenditures.
We believe that adoption of the proposal programs under continuing review, and the
for an annual expenditure budget would President’s budget contemplate amend
permit more effective control over govern ments to them when their operation con
ment expenditures. It is recognized that flicts with current budgetary policy.
adoption of this proposal will require ad
Let’s discuss another situation regarding
ministrative changes in the government’s government expenditures. When Congress
budgeting and accounting procedures, par passes appropriations and grants the funds
ticularly in the Department of Defense.
needed, the responsibility for budget execu
There is another situation which leaves tion lies within the agencies and the Bureau
Congress little control of the budget. This of the Budget.
arises when Congress enacts legislation for
The Bureau’s control over appropriated
undertakings which leave the appropria funds is based upon a system of agency
tions committees little discretion as to the financial reports. It operates primarily
amounts to be appropriated.
through the apportionment of funds, the
For example, in fiscal year 1955 there establishment of reserves, review and ap
7

Officers responsible for the disbursement of
funds are personally liable to the govern
ment for proper performance of their finan
cial duties. This personal liability attaches
to any violations of statutes, even though
they be unintentional and even though the
officer himself did not make the mistake
which resulted in the violation.
Therefore, accountable officers frequently
seek advice as to the application of laws to
the facts in a particular case in which he
is called upon to make a payment. The nat
ural tendency is for them, in self-protection,
to request an advance decision from the
General Accounting Office with respect to
any case in which they have the slightest
question as to the legality of a payment.
They are, in consequence, overcautious in
the performance of their duties. As an ex
ample, the Claims Division of the General
Accounting Office received about 29,000
vouchers under open appropriations from
the military’s accountable officers during
fiscal year 1954, which, according to a GAO
analysis, did not involve any doubtful or
complex matters.
It is unduly harsh to hold an officer
liable where he has acted in good faith and
shown reasonable diligence. Moreover, the
expense involved in investigating and dis
posing of exceptions involving alleged vio
lations is not warranted.
We, therefore, recommended that account
able officers be relieved of financial liability
except where losses resulted from their
gross negligence or fraud.
In the field of governmental accounting
there is much to be done. The systems used
in some departments are antiquated by in
dustrial standards. Accounting in the Fed
eral Government is still mainly concerned
with cash transactions and has not kept
pace with the needs of management arising
from increasing complexity of government
operations. There is a great deal of dupli
cation in record keeping. For example, the
Treasury Department maintained about
7,000 detailed accounts which duplicated in
large measure similar records maintained
in other agencies.
In 1950 Congress passed the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act which provided,
among other things, that . . . “The Comp
troller General of the United States, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget conduct a con
tinuous program for the improvement of ac
counting and financial reporting in the
Government.”
While a means of coordination was thus
provided, there was in fact no central guid

proval of agency regulations governing
control of funds, analysis of audit reports,
and such specialized measures as regulations
designed to discourage excessive year-end
purchasing (“June buying”).
The rate at which appropriations may be
obligated by the agencies is regulated by
apportionment of obligational authority
(usually on a quarterly basis) after con
sideration of agencies’ requests. These ap
portionments are further subdivided by the
agencies into allotments to their organiza
tional subdivisions. Depending upon the
complexity of an agency’s organization, the
allotments are further divided and sub
allotted to lower levels. This results in a
multitude of pockets of obligational author
ity, and each allotment constitutes a ceil
ing of expenditures which cannot be ex
ceeded.
In the Department of Defense, it is im
possible to obtain readily a reliable estimate
of the number of allocations, allotments,
suballotments and administrative subdivi
sions of allotments which are in active use
and for which accounts are kept. At a mini
mum there were over a hundred thousand
in that department alone.
There was a tendency in the government
to attempt management control through
this device of controlling funds. The allot
ment system in itself does not usually pro
vide management with the financial in
formation required for measuring the
efficiency and economy with which funds
are used. Actually, the allotment system
places emphasis on the ability to live with
in allotments rather than the usual man
agement criterion of performance in terms
of cost. Another defect in the allotment sys
tem is the inherent incentive to spend all
allotted funds in order to support succeed
ing allotment requests. A more positive ap
proach is needed under which an appraisal
of both good and poor performance can be
brought to light.
This system of multiple allotments cre
ates another condition. Under the Anti
Deficiency Act, whenever an allotment is
exceeded the agency must render an imme
diate report to the President, through the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and
to the Congress.
This necessitated the reporting to the
President and the Congress of a large num
ber of technical violations where administra
tive divisions and subdivisions of allot
ments have been exceeded. These violations
are attributable to the unnecessarily com
plicated and detailed allotment structure.
Now for another phase of this problem.
8

ance or control in the Executive Branch
over accounting performance.
The essence of the problem as we saw it,
was what form of organization is needed to
bring about improvements in government
accounting and where should it be placed,
preferably without setting up a new
agency ?
This function did not belong in the Treas
ury Department where there is enough to
be done in fiscal accounts without assuming
responsibility for central direction of ac
counting in all other agencies. Neither did
it belong in the General Accounting Office.
The Comptroller General is the auditor and
critic of the accounting and financial man
agement of the Executive agencies. The
General Accounting Office is an independent
agency in Legislative Branch of the Gov
ernment, having wide powers of examina
tion and reporting directly to the Congress.
This independence should not be diluted.
The Comptroller General should not be di
rectly involved in the administration of the
Executive agencies.
The logical place for this function, we
felt, was in the Bureau of the Budget. The
Bureau had four principal staff offices, each
under an Assistant Director, namely:
Office of Budget Review
Office of Legislative Reference
Office of Statistical Standards
Office of Management and Organization
In order to meet his accounting respon
sibilities we proposed that there be estab
lished under the Director of the Budget a
fifth staff office headed by an Assistant
Director for Accounting and that such of
fice be named “Office of Accounting”.
This Assistant Director for Accounting
should be an accountant well qualified by
training and experience to perform this
function. He should have ability and repu
tation such as will gain respect and enlist
cooperation throughout the Executive agen
cies.
His duties should be:
1. To develop an overall plan for account
ing and reporting for all of the de
partments and agencies, consistent
with broad policies and standards pre
scribed by the Comptroller General.
2. To assist in the introduction of mod
ern accounting methods in the Execu
tive agencies.
3. To set reasonable but definite time
schedules for performance and to
watch progress.
4. To stimulate the building of compe
tent accounting and auditing organi
zations in the Executive agencies and
9

to assist actively in the selection,
training and retention of capable per
sonnel.
5. To report at least annually to the Di
rector of the Bureau with respect to
the status of accounting in each of the
Executive agencies.
The performance of these duties would
require him to maintain close cooperation
with the General Accounting Office and the
Treasury Department in the development of
Government accounting problems. It would
also require him to maintain a small but
select staff of well-qualified assistants to
operate with the various Executive agen
cies.
In this connection, our Task Force also
recommended the appointment of a com
petent comptroller in each of the important
departments and agencies.
Under our concept of comptrollership,
he would occupy an advisory role in man
agement. While he would not make manage
ment decisions, the comptroller should be
invaluable as an adviser and interpreter to
management. As a result of his intimate
knowledge of the financial facts, the comp
troller can assist management in reaching
sound decisions.
We recommended 'that the comptroller
should be directly responsible to the head
of the agency in order to assure indepen
dence and objectivity in the performance
of his duty. He should also be responsible
to the Assistant Director for Accounting in
the Bureau of the Budget for the observ
ance of the standards and policies laid down
by him. He should be a principal officer
whose duties are, as they would be in pri
vate industry:
1. To set up adequate accounting and
auditing systems.
2. To recruit, train and develop qualified
accounting personnel.
3. To point out opportunities for econ
omies.
4. To furnish reliable financial reports
for the management of the agency,
for Congress, and for other Executive
departments.
5. To interpret and advise upon signi
ficant aspects of the financial reports.
6. To direct the preparation and execu
tion of budgets in the agency.
Agency accounting has been limited in
most cases to accounting for cash expendi
tures. We recommended that modern ac
counting systems be installed and main
tained on the accrual basis. Such systems
should permit the preparation of periodical
financial statements for each agency show

ing what it owns and what it owes, as well
as the current costs of the various opera
tions within it.
While it would always be necessary to
account for expenditures of appropriated
funds, a system of accrual accounting would
also make possible a record of the dollar
value of inventories, of real estate and
other property, as well as their applica
tion to costs.
Until all of the departments have ade
quate accounting systems under competent
supervision, it will not be possible to know
the real costs of operating the Federal
Government or to prepare reliable combined
reports for the entire government showing
the accrued receipts and expenditures of
the Federal Government, the fixed assets
owned by it (real estate, buildings, equip
ment, etc.), the inventories and other work
ing capital of the government, as well as
the obligations payable by the government.
In other words, if we expect to produce the
kind of financial statements which every
modern business institution must have, we
felt it would be necessary to modernize the
government accounting systems so as to
know the accrued revenues and costs, as
well as assets and liabilities of the Federal
Government.
As for the saving of $4 billion set out
in our report, it is not possible to pinpoint
this saving and indicate in detail where it
may be accomplished. Necessarily, much
of it must come in the Department of De
fense, but we did not contemplate any re
duction in the defense program. The sav
ing can be brought about by better methods,
better control, elimination of duplication in
effort, reduction of excessive stocks of goods,
greater efficiency and better organization.
So much for the work of our Task Force
on Budget and Accounting. You are nat
urally interested in what has happened
since our report was presented in June
1955.
A great deal has been accomplished since
then—some by legislation, some by execu
tive order, and some by voluntary adoption
by the agencies.
The legislation passed included, among
other things, the adoption of accrual ac
counting, but it did not provide for the
adoption of accrual expenditure appropria
tion procedure. President Eisenhower has
announced that he will recommend to the
next Congress additional legislation to ac
complish this further step.
A new staff office of accounting under the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget has
been set up, headed by an assistant Director

for Accounting. It is under the direction of
Percy Rappaport, formerly in public ac
counting for many years, and a very able
person. He and his staff are hard at work
and have already brought about worthwhile
improvements.
Meanwhile many of the agencies have
selected competent comptrollers and prog
ress is being made there as well.
A few months ago our committee met
with representatives of the Bureau of the
Budget, General Accounting Office, Treas
ury Department and Defense Department,
and I was encouraged with the accomplish
ments to date and the spirit with which
this whole program was being pursued. Ob
viously, the program will take a lot of time
—it cannot be done overnight, but I am
very hopeful about the eventual outcome.
In closing, I should like to pay tribute
to the Chairman of the Commission, Mr.
Herbert Hoover. He is a most remarkable
man of tremendous capacity. It was amaz
ing to see what an intimate knowledge he
had of the problems we were dealing with,
as well as the overall problems arising out
of the functional organization of the entire
Federal Government. He has made a great
contribution toward better government.
*
*
*
(Continued from page 4)
“With respect to increasing knowledge
about the effective development and utili
zation of womanpower . . .
1. Universities, foundations, and gov
ernment encourage and support re
search dealing with the impact of the
increased employment of women upon
family life, the rearing of children,
and the self-development of women;
upon the process of occupational
choice among both younger and older
women; upon the prosperity of the
economy and living standards; and
upon the availability of volunteer
workers for community service func
tions
2. The Secretary of Labor initiate a com
prehensive study of the maximum use
which could be made of the actual and
potential resources of womanpower
in the event of a national emergency
3. The Secretary of Labor take the ini
tiative in establishing a commission
to review, in the light of recent
changes in technology and the econ
omy and in the composition of the
female labor force, the consequences
and adequacy of existing Federal and
state laws which have a direct bear
ing on the employment of women.”
10

